Laurie Laybourn-Langton , Michael Jacobs. This paper seeks to understand the processes of paradigm shifts in economic ideas and policy. We begin with an explanation of the concept of a "politico-economic paradigm", with reference to the theory and history of the two paradigm shifts occurring in the 20th century. We then examine how the second of these, the shift to "neoliberalism", occurred. The final section assesses the degree to which economic and political conditions since the financial crisis offer an opportunity for a new paradigm shift away from neoliberalism.
Teeny Tiny. Campus sexual assault is Latina fundraising ideas wide-spread problem in institutions of higher learning across the world. We chose a class that has 35 undergraduate students to conduct experimental survey, and observed their participation Archieved theories dominant models one semester, and then conducted questionnaire and semi-structured interview domjnant the end of the semester. Implementation of that legislation has met with many difficulties. The paper draws on initial ground work conducted by the author who is thinking through the potential for developing a specialised module on trauma informed recordkeeping to be offered through the Department of Information Studies at UCL to postgraduate students. This encouraging response has led to Michaela and Nicola ,odels and speaking widely Archieved theories dominant models the subject since, discussing the need dominnat a community of practice to support individuals, to build capacity and enact trauma informed practices.
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What follows is not just a simple trip down the history of instructional designits models and theories. In some cases, models can also be used to confirm a theory. They dominwnt structure for the formulation of theories. Theoriez may come up with both models and theories after performing the step-by-step process of scientific methods; however, models and theories are produced in different periods and levels of the study. User assumes Free gallery photo trans risk of use, damage, or injury. In some instances, models can also be seen as an application of theories. Sign In with LinkedIn. Models may Archieved theories dominant models produced after the formulation of theories, but there can be Archieved theories dominant models where the models are produced before the theories. There can also be cases when models produce theories that in turn lead to the construction of another model for the verification of a theory. Email required. We also use this access to retrieve the following information: Your full name. Get New Comparisons in your inbox:.
Illustration: Marian Bantjes "All models are wrong , but some are useful.
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Laurie Laybourn-Langton , Michael Jacobs. This paper seeks to understand the processes of paradigm shifts in economic ideas and policy. We begin with an explanation of the concept of a "politico-economic paradigm", with reference to the theory and history of the two paradigm shifts occurring in the 20th century. We then examine how the second of these, the shift to "neoliberalism", occurred.
The final section assesses the degree to which economic and political conditions since the financial crisis offer an opportunity for a new paradigm shift away from neoliberalism. Modern economic history can be roughly split into different eras in which certain sets of ideas have dominated politics and policy. We shall refer to a dominant group of ideas as a politico-economic paradigm.
Politico-economic paradigms can exert a powerful influence over academic and media debates, as well as on policymaking institutions, both national and international.
Over the last hundred years, Western political economy has broadly experienced two major periods of breakdown and transition from one politico-economic paradigm to another. The second was from the post-war consensus to neoliberalism, starting with the currency and oil shocks of the early s and the adoption of free market economic policies in the s, ushering in the current period of neoliberalism.
Each period of change featured a series of economic and political crises, the failure of orthodox ideas and policies to explain and respond to them, and the resultant replacement of the orthodoxy by a new approach. A body of literature has sought to understand this change process, influenced by Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts in the natural sciences. According to this theory, change occurs when two conditions are met: first, a critical mass in the number or importance of "anomalies" which contradict the dominant paradigm, and second, the successful development of an alternative theory that better explains the prevailing evidence.
Lakatos built on these ideas, arguing that changes in science could be seen in terms of "research programmes" that are either "progressive" or "degenerating". In contrast, degenerating programmes persist with old theories and ideas, despite their failure to explain the available evidence, and so eventually abdicate their previous status as progressive programmes.
Degenerating programmes can have undue staying power, enjoying an incumbency advantage underpinned by the vested interests of leading scientists. A shift in paradigm only occurs when progressive programmes gather sufficient support to overcome the hold of a degenerating programme and a tipping point is reached, after which the old programme is superseded.
While providing useful heuristics, these theories nevertheless need careful application in the field of economics and public policy, which is fundamentally uncertain and in which hypotheses can never be irrefutably falsified.
Economic policy is developed through a process of political choices and "social learning" in which policymakers decide on new goals and methods with only partial reference to academic theory or evidence. The inherent uncertainty of economic prediction and the political nature of policymaking make it easier for degenerating programmes to retain their incumbency advantage, aided by vested interests.
Hall argued that economic policy can exhibit three "orders" of change, increasing in their magnitude: adjustment of an existing policy, change in the policy and change in the goals of policy altogether. Similar patterns of change can be observed in both of the politico-economic paradigm shifts which occurred in the 20th century. Here, we use the theories described above to set out the key characteristics of the shift process, illustrated by the transition from the post-war paradigm to neoliberalism in the s.
The prevailing orthodoxy : Since WWII, rising economic growth and incomes cemented the social democratic consensus into a Kuhnian worldview. Keynesian demand management led to the targeting of full employment as the primary indicator of economic success. By the s, policymakers were placing considerable weight on the Phillips Curve — the apparent trade-off between unemployment and inflation — to guide the management of the economy.
The fixed exchange rate regime of the Bretton Woods settlement and financial regulation provided stable conditions for the growth of international trade. Economic shocks and crisis : The breakdown of the international monetary order in the wake of the US leaving the gold standard led to a deterioration in several countries' balance of payments positions, driving inflation higher. The decision by oil producers to raise oil prices added to the inflationary shock, precipitating recessions.
A long-term decline in the competitiveness of significant industrial sectors and poor industrial relations exposed severe weaknesses in the productive capacity of economies, particularly in the UK. Breakdown and transition in orthodoxy : The phenomenon of stagflation simultaneously high inflation and unemployment contradicted the Phillips Curve, while the failure of policies targeting prices and incomes to control inflation, or currency devaluation to restore competitiveness, left few available policy options within the Keynesian framework.
Overall, a critical mass of Kuhnian anomalies led to the degeneration of the incumbent politico-economic paradigm. An alternative progressive programme emerged, marking itself in opposition to Keynesian collectivism.
As politicians and policymakers cast around for solutions to the crisis, the proponents of this new approach seemed to offer an escape from instability. New economic policy : Following continual growth in support from policymakers throughout the s, the elections of Margaret Thatcher in and Ronald Reagan in marked the full-fledged emergence of a new paradigm.
New governments precipitated a third order change in policy, switching the principal object of macroeconomic policy from unemployment to inflation. While monetarism was soon abandoned, the wider neoliberal worldview took hold. The state's economic role was drastically diminished to a guarantor of stable economic conditions, alongside significant reductions in taxes and spending, the deregulation of markets, and curtailment of trade unions.
The Society served as the nexus through which a critique of the post-war settlement and the diverse tenets of neoliberalism were generated, as well as a concerted programme of institution-building and political strategy. To understand the way in which the paradigm shift occurred, it is helpful to disaggregate it into three components or levels:.
The neoliberal movement started with an intellectual and academic component through the MPS. It then built a coherent narrative and policy proposals to spread its ideas, performed by a well-resourced ecosystem of institutions and networks mobilised to influence public debate and political processes.
Though the academic level is often thought of as most important to the rise of neoliberalism, the shift was actually weakest there; some neoliberal ideas were powerful but never became hegemonic. It was stronger at the level of discourse and narrative, where it came to dominate the way in which economic analysis and policy were discussed in public debate.
It was only decisive at the level of politics and policy: the election of neoliberal-influenced governments ensured a full paradigm shift.
The MPS always stressed the need for the neoliberal intellectual project to be multi-disciplinary. From the start, philosophical, historical, legal, political and natural science concepts were used alongside economics. Inevitably, this resulted in differing paths of development across disciplines and countries.
For example, there was a considerable difference between the first Chicago School of Frank Knight, which had similarities with ordoliberalism in Germany, and the second Chicago School of Milton Friedman, whose more radical critique of the state came to underpin the development of Anglo-American capitalism. In the US and the UK, Friedman's monetarist theory was joined by a number of other socio-economic theories that spanned disciplines.
New Classical economists suggested that macroeconomic models must include rigorous microeconomic parameters that reflected the decision-making behaviours which, in their view, governed human beings and societies.
This required a return to neoclassical foundations, eventually emerging in the theory of rational expectations. In game theory, the rational expectations assumption was given a theoretical underpinning that drew on the natural sciences. Though early game theoretic models appeared only to be applicable in extreme circumstances, their assumptions and theoretical insights were soon adopted by those modelling the behaviour of institutions.
Public choice theory condemned the idea of the "public interest" as a subjective hypocrisy used to mask the self-interest of bureaucrats and politicians, suggesting that government should operate a system of incentive structures that would harness the inevitable self-interest of public servants. Theories of regulatory capture used the public choice assumption to conclude all regulators are self-interested. These insights added up to a coherent whole with a power greater than the sum of its parts.
Not only did it provide a counter-narrative to the failures of the mainstream politico-economic paradigm in the s, but the combination of these ideas appeared to offer a more "scientific" analysis of the economy and society than offered by the Keynesian orthodoxy. Moreover, it presented plausible solutions at a time when the previous policy was failing — a result in part of the pleasing inner logic of much of neoliberal thought. Importantly, these analyses and their attendant policies were attractively sold as having a universality that would serve different times and places and which allowed for better understanding of economic actors.
While hegemonic across politics and policy, it is important to recognise that neoliberalism was never all-encompassing within the academic realm. Whereas in the natural sciences, a Kuhnian paradigm shift will lead to the near-universal adoption of the new theory, this is less likely in the more uncertain social sciences.
The neoliberal framework gradually came to dominate leading economic journals and textbooks, but significant debate remained within disciplines, and in macroeconomics in particular there were accommodations between old and new approaches. In the case of new classical economics, the attempt to change macroeconomics in both theory and practice only led to victory in the latter.
In general, hegemonic change in academia is neither likely nor necessary to generate a paradigm shift in the wider world. For such a shift to occur, sufficient change at an opportune time must be combined with attractive and seemingly coherent concepts and narratives. The MPS members' initial ideas were marked by dispute, contradiction and divergence — but they ultimately led to the emergence of a coherent narrative.
Hayek founded the MPS to create a safe space for those with shared philosophical ideas and political ideals to learn, educate and strive toward a common cause. In doing so, he followed a reflexive model for changing the intellectual and practical elements of a paradigm. Academia creates the tools for and legitimises the cause of a political project, which, in turn, influences academia through social learning, morality and values, and material factors, such as increases in funding and other incumbency advantages resulting from a higher profile and greater influence.
Two conditions are essential to realising change through this model. First, ideas must form part of a coherent narrative that can be easily shared and adapted without central control. Second, an extensive, well-resourced ecosystem of enabling institutions and networks must be developed. In the s and s, the MPS coalesced around an opposition to "collectivism", concluding that an increased role for the state in economic and social management was incompatible with individual freedom.
Recognising that they shared a critique of the new social democratic order, the early years of the MPS were dominated by the development of a statement of aims to act as a focal point for those seeking to move from opposition to proposition. Crucially, this statement of aims is political and defines a clear ideological direction; it is neither an academic nor a technical document, and it does not focus purely on a critique of the incumbent paradigm.
This allowed the statement to provide a clear signal to those with views sympathetic to those of the MPS and a focus for the movement's activities. In doing so, it allowed for the decentralisation of both the development of the intellectual component of a new paradigm and the ecosystem that would bring it into practice.
A common narrative based around the MPS statement of aims helped bind the incipient movement together. But it needed an ecosystem of people, networks and institutions to propagate it within the public sphere. This ecosystem was developed by key individuals with a strong understanding of power and how knowledge is transmitted into action.
Its leading figures were Hayek and Friedman, who effectively acted as nodal points, connecting different elements of the ecosystem. This was an elite theory of change that focused on influencing current and future opinion leaders.
The transmission mechanism from ideas to practice started in private via platforms, such as the MPS, that afforded security and limited scrutiny.
After building coalitions, many members of the MPS went back to academia, from where they predominantly originated, to promote and develop neoliberal ideas.
Soon, the support of wealthy interests — including the Volker Fund, Relm Foundation, General Electric and DuPont — enabled more meetings, networks and academic work.
These resources were soon used to create a new breed of "knowledge professional" located within the new institutional form of the modern think tank — politically partisan and focused on strategic influence as well as policy development.
Journalists then provided the means by which neoliberal ideas could enter wider circulation. By the early s, the neoliberal counter-orthodoxy had organised into a transatlantic network.
Its members were well-resourced and mobilised, influencing elite groups, political parties and individuals, seeking out and assimilating allied concepts, and fashioning narratives to appeal to political needs. In doing so, they soon led the critique of the incumbent paradigm as it began to falter in the s. By the late s, this network and its ideas had increasingly populated political parties and government institutions, developing strong networks of individuals that spanned important sectional interests.
This ecosystem created the intellectual conditions for change, ensuring that the neoliberal movement was prepared to capitalise on crisis. The policy impotence of the incumbent post-war paradigm gave the movement its chance.
In the end, successive crises both intellectually and politically delegitimised the post-war consensus. But it was the elections of right-wing political parties under Thatcher and Reagan that enabled the political displacement of the post-war paradigm in practice. Explicitly influenced by neoliberal networks, the Republican and Conservative governments of the s gradually introduced policies of deregulation, privatisation, tax reductions and labour market "flexibility", radically changing the political economy of the US and UK, and eventually, by wider transmission, that of most other Western nations.
Meanwhile, changes to the economic curriculum in universities and the adoption of neoliberal assumptions across the field of economic understanding and practice had a deep socio-cultural effect, entrenching the idea that economic and political freedoms can be equated and elevating deregulated markets as the only efficient mechanism for allocating resources.
A crucial result was the acceptance by previously oppositional parties of key aspects of the neoliberal consensus.
When scientists have come up with a model showing structures of the scientific method, repeated experiments following the model will be conducted in order to come up with acceptable theories. Help us improve. Discover, choose and compare the top eLearning Authoring Tools Providers! We use LinkedIn to ensure that our users are real professionals who contribute and share reliable content. There is no need to resubmit your comment. Observation of ants in their natural habitat may be difficult, and he will feel the need to devise a physical model, which may take the form of an ant colony inside a glass box. Sign In with LinkedIn.
Archieved theories dominant models. References :
Each of the following 33 instructional design milestones has been chosen not only for its importance in the field of learning, but also for its impact for future generations, research and various related disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, demography, and even biology and physiology. Each instructional design model and theory presented in this chronology will be analyzed thoroughly, yet concisely, and accompanied by the necessary real world examples.
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We also use this access to retrieve the following information: Your full name. Your primary email address. Scientific studies and discoveries come about after a well-thought-out hypothesis and thoroughly conducted experiments that produce models and theories. Students may encounter countless models and theories of famous scientists who once aimed to explain the different phenomena. The definitions of the two terms can be confusing. Students may come up with both models and theories after performing the step-by-step process of scientific methods; however, models and theories are produced in different periods and levels of the study.
Models may be produced after the formulation of theories, but there can be instances where the models are produced before the theories. There can also be cases when models produce theories that in turn lead to the construction of another model for the verification of a theory. Note that one difference relies upon the fact that models are the basis of theories, while theories are the main basis for the explanation of different phenomena.
Models come in the form of a verbal, visual, or mathematical representation of a prospect or scientific process of structure that should be followed by scientists in order to come up with theories and test inferences. They can then be formulated after conducting extensive observations of physical phenomena.
When scientists have come up with a model showing structures of the scientific method, repeated experiments following the model will be conducted in order to come up with acceptable theories. In some instances, models can also be seen as an application of theories. They consist of a given group of boundary conditions that serve as a projected possibility based on the premises of a certain theory. When the behavior of the Eiffel Tower during an earthquake is being observed, for example, a computer simulation may show the possible movements based on what the Prandtl-Meyer stress-strain relationship theory implies.
In this scenario, models result from what theories state instead of the other way around. Models can also be defined as a physical representation of a theory. A scientist studying the behavior of ants in a colony, for example, can have set theories on how the ants gather and store food. Observation of ants in their natural habitat may be difficult, and he will feel the need to devise a physical model, which may take the form of an ant colony inside a glass box.
As the scientist observes the behaviors of the devised model, theories can then be confirmed, rejected, restated, or changed. Physical models can, therefore, be a tool for the verification of the theory.
Simply put, both a model and a theory state possibilities and provide explanations for natural phenomena. Models can be used in the formulation of experimental setups as the scientist performs the steps of the scientific method. They give structure for the formulation of theories. Models may also serve as the representation of possibilities with respect to the premises of theories; scientists can create simulations and formulate hypotheses modeled after the theories.
Models in Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Models are of central importance in many scientific contexts. The centrality of models such as the billiard ball model of a gas, the Bohr model of the atom, the MIT bag model of the nucleon, the Gaussian-chain model of a polymer, the Lorenz model of the atmosphere, the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey interaction, the double helix model of DNA, agent-based and evolutionary models in the social sciences, and general equilibrium models of markets in their respective domains are cases in point.
Scientists spend a great deal of time building, testing, comparing and revising models, and much journal space is dedicated to introducing, applying and interpreting these valuable tools. In short, models are one of the principal instruments of modern science. Philosophers are acknowledging the importance of models with increasing attention and are probing the assorted roles that models play in scientific practice.
The result has been an incredible proliferation of model-types in the philosophical literature. Probing models, phenomenological models, computational models, developmental models, explanatory models, impoverished models, testing models, idealized models, theoretical models, scale models, heuristic models, caricature models, didactic models, fantasy models, toy models, imaginary models, mathematical models, substitute models, iconic models, formal models, analogue models and instrumental models are but some of the notions that are used to categorize models.
While at first glance this abundance is overwhelming, it can quickly be brought under control by recognizing that these notions pertain to different problems that arise in connection with models. For example, models raise questions in semantics what is the representational function that models perform? Models can perform two fundamentally different representational functions. Depending on the nature of the target, such models are either models of phenomena or models of data.
On the other hand, a model can represent a theory in the sense that it interprets the laws and axioms of that theory. These two notions are not mutually exclusive as scientific models can be representations in both senses at the same time. Empiricists like van Fraassen only allow for observables to qualify as such, while realists like Bogen and Woodward do not impose any such restrictions.
The billiard ball model of a gas, the Bohr model of the atom, the double helix model of DNA, the scale model of a bridge, the Mundell-Fleming model of an open economy, or the Lorenz model of the atmosphere are well-known examples for models of this kind. A first step towards a discussion of the issue of scientific representation is to realize that there is no such thing as the problem of scientific representation.
Rather, there are different but related problems. It is not yet clear what specific set of questions a theory of representation has to come to terms with, but whatever list of questions one might put on the agenda of a theory of scientific representation, there are two problems that will occupy center stage in the discussion Frigg The first problem is to explain in virtue of what a model is a representation of something else. To appreciate the thrust of this question we have to anticipate a position as regards the ontology of models which we discuss in the next section.
It is now common to construe models as non-linguistic entities rather than as descriptions. This approach has wide-ranging consequences. If we understand models as descriptions, the above question would be reduced to the time-honored problem of how language relates to reality and there would not be any problems over and above those already discussed in the philosophy of language.
However, if we understand models as non-linguistic entities, we are faced with the new question of what it is for an object that is not a word or a sentence to scientifically represent a phenomenon. Somewhat surprisingly, until recently this question has not attracted much attention in twentieth century philosophy of science, despite the fact that the corresponding problems in the philosophy of mind and in aesthetics have been discussed extensively for decades there is a substantial body of literature dealing with the question of what it means for a mental state to represent a certain state of affairs; and the question of how a configuration of flat marks on a canvass can depict something beyond this canvass has puzzled aestheticians for a long time.
The second problem is concerned with representational styles. It is a commonplace that one can represent the same subject matter in different ways. This pluralism does not seem to be a prerogative of the fine arts as the representations used in the sciences are not all of one kind either.
What representational styles are there in the sciences? Although this question is not explicitly addressed in the literature on the so-called semantic view of theories, some answers seem to emerge from its understanding of models.
One version of the semantic view, one that builds on a mathematical notion of models see Sec. Formal requirements weaker than these have been discussed by Mundy and Swoyer Another version of the semantic view drops formal requirements in favor of similarity Giere and , Teller This approach enjoys the advantage over the isomorphism view that it is less restrictive and also can account for cases of inexact and simplifying models.
However, as Giere points out, this account remains empty as long as no relevant respects and degrees of similarity are specified. The specification of such respects and degrees depends on the problem at hand and the larger scientific context and cannot be made on the basis of purely philosophical considerations Teller Further notions that can be understood as addressing the issue of representational styles have been introduced in the literature on models.
Among them, scale models, idealized models, analogical models and phenomenological models play an important role.
These categories are not mutually exclusive; for instance, some scale models would also qualify as idealized models and it is not clear where exactly to draw the line between idealized and analogue models.
Scale models. Some models are basically down-sized or enlarged copies of their target systems Black Typical examples are wooden cars or model bridges. However, there is no such thing as a perfectly faithful scale model; faithfulness is always restricted to some respects. The wooden model of the car, for instance, provides a faithful portrayal of the car's shape but not its material.
Scale models seem to be a special case of a broader category of representations that Peirce dubbed icons: representations that stand for something else because they closely resemble it Peirce — Vol. This raises the question of what criteria a model has to satisfy in order to qualify as an icon.
Although we seem to have strong intuitions about how to answer this question in particular cases, no theory of iconicity for models has been formulated yet. Idealized models. An idealization is a deliberate simplification of something complicated with the objective of making it more tractable.
Frictionless planes, point masses, infinite velocities, isolated systems, omniscient agents, and markets in perfect equilibrium are but some well-know examples. Philosophical debates over idealization have focused on two general kinds of idealizations: so-called Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations.
This allows us to focus on a limited set of properties in isolation. An example is a classical mechanics model of the planetary system, describing the planets as objects only having shape and mass, disregarding all other properties.
Galilean idealizations are ones that involve deliberate distortions. Physicists build models consisting of point masses moving on frictionless planes, economists assume that agents are omniscient, biologists study isolated populations, and so on.
It was characteristic of Galileo's approach to science to use simplifications of this sort whenever a situation was too complicated to tackle. Galilean idealizations are beset with riddles. What does a model involving distortions of this kind tell us about reality? How can we test its accuracy? In reply to these questions Laymon has put forward a theory which understands idealizations as ideal limits: imagine a series of experimental refinements of the actual situation which approach the postulated limit and then require that the closer the properties of a system come to the ideal limit, the closer its behavior has to come to the behavior of the ideal limit monotonicity.
But these conditions need not always hold and it is not clear how to understand situations in which no ideal limit exists. We can, at least in principle, produce a series of table tops that are ever more slippery but we cannot possibly produce a series of systems in which Planck's constant approaches zero. This raises the question of whether one can always make an idealized model more realistic by de-idealizing it. We will come back to this issue in section 5. Galilean and Aristotelian idealizations are not mutually exclusive.
On the contrary, they often come together. Consider again the mechanical model of the planetary system: the model only takes into account a narrow set of properties and distorts these, for instance by describing planets as ideal spheres with a rotation-symmetric mass distribution.
Caricature models isolate a small number of salient characteristics of a system and distort them into an extreme case. A classical example is Ackerlof's model of the car market, which explains the difference in price between new and used cars solely in terms of asymmetric information, thereby disregarding all other factors that may influence prices of cars.
However, it is controversial whether such highly idealized models can still be regarded as informative representations of their target systems for a discussion of caricature models, in particular in economics, see Reiss At this point we would like to mention a notion that seems to be closely related to idealization, namely approximation. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there seems to be a clear difference between the two. Approximations are introduced in a mathematical context.
One mathematical item is an approximation of another one if it is close to it in some relevant sense. What this item is may vary.
Sometimes we want to approximate one curve with another one. This happens when we expand a function into a power series and only keep the first two or three terms. In other situations we approximate an equation by another one by letting a control parameter tend towards zero Redhead The salient point is that the issue of physical interpretation need not arise.
Unlike Galilean idealization, which involves a distortion of a real system, approximation is a purely formal matter. This, of course, does not imply that there cannot be interesting relations between approximations and idealization. Analogical models. Standard examples of analogical models include the hydraulic model of an economic system, the billiard ball model of a gas, the computer model of the mind or the liquid drop model of the nucleus. At the most basic level, two things are analogous if there are certain relevant similarities between them.
Hesse distinguishes different types of analogies according to the kinds of similarity relations in which two objects enter. A simple type of analogy is one that is based on shared properties. There is an analogy between the earth and the moon based on the fact that both are large, solid, opaque, spherical bodies, receiving heat and light from the sun, revolving around their axes, and gravitating towards other bodies.
But sameness of properties is not a necessary condition. An analogy between two objects can also be based on relevant similarities between their properties. In this more liberal sense we can say that there is an analogy between sound and light because echoes are similar to reflections, loudness to brightness, pitch to color, detectability by the ear to detectability by the eye, and so on.
Analogies can also be based on the sameness or resemblance of relations between parts of two systems rather than on their monadic properties. It is this sense that some politicians assert that the relation of a father to his children is analogous to the relation of the state to the citizens. We obtain a more formal notion of analogy when we abstract from the concrete features the systems possess and only focus on their formal set-up.
What the analogue model then shares with its target is not a set of features, but the same pattern of abstract relationships i. Two items are related by formal analogy if they are both interpretations of the same formal calculus.
For instance, there is a formal analogy between a swinging pendulum and an oscillating electric circuit because they are both described by the same mathematical equation. A further distinction due to Hesse is the one between positive, negative and neutral analogies. The positive analogy between two items consists in the properties or relations they share both gas molecules and billiard balls have mass , the negative analogy in the ones they do not share billiard balls are colored, gas molecules are not.
The neutral analogy comprises the properties of which it is not known yet whether they belong to the positive or the negative analogy.